



TORONTO MODEL UNITED NATIONS II
DISEC

Director's Letter

Dear honorable delegates,

My name is Richard Xue, and I have the utmost pleasure of being your director of TMUN's DISEC committee. I am delighted to be serving on your dias team, alongside your two chairs, Leela Bhide and Naina Ganatra. Together, we welcome you to join our committee.

As a grade 11 student of Dr. EP Scarlett High School, this will be my fourth year of Model UN, and through those four years, Model UN has been an integral part of both my middle school and high school career, shaping me into the individual I am today. Throughout my middle school and high school years, Model UN has played a crucial role in shaping my identity and has given me invaluable opportunities to develop skills in diplomacy, negotiation, and public speaking. By choosing to join this committee, I am confident that you will also embark on a similar transformative journey and create unforgettable memories.

TMUN places significant importance on fostering intellectual discussions and maintaining a professional environment. Therefore, it is expected that all delegates participating in the Disarmament and International Security Committee come prepared, with a deep understanding of their committee's objectives, the relevant subject matter, and their country's foreign policy. While we want this committee to be enjoyable and engaging, the topics we will be debating require extensive research and a comprehensive understanding to facilitate productive deliberations. This experience will contribute to your personal growth and understanding of not only Model UN but also international affairs, ultimately enhancing the committee's overall performance.

This background guide has been carefully prepared to provide you with essential information and context on our topic. However, it should be viewed only as a starting point. We strongly encourage you to go beyond the information presented here and conduct thorough research on your assigned delegation to ensure that you are well-prepared for the conference. Feel free to explore additional resources to deepen your understanding and improve your performance.

If you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to reach out to me at [richardxue789@gmail.com]. Whether this is your first Model UN conference or you are a seasoned delegate, your chairs and I are here to support you every step of the way.

Sincerely,

Richard Xue

Director of the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC)

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Committee Overview

The Disarmament and International Security Committee, also known as DISEC, plays a crucial role as part of the United Nations General Assembly. Established back in 1945, it stands as one of the original main committees of the UN General Assembly, signifying the profound importance of disarmament, international security, and the pursuit of peaceful conflict resolutions in the pursuit of global peace and stability. DISEC's inclusion as one of the original six main committees of the UN General Assembly underscores the world's recognition of the vital role disarmament and security play in achieving these noble objectives. This committee operates in strict accordance with the principles and provisions outlined in the United Nations Charter, with a particular focus on Article 11 within Chapter IV of the UN Charter. This framework was established by the UN's founding members, who recognized the pressing need to address disarmament and prevent the proliferation of weapons that could potentially lead to devastating conflicts.¹

DISEC, short for the Disarmament and International Security Committee, is primarily focused on tackling some critical global issues, such as disarmament, arms control, and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Its main goal is to encourage countries to reduce their military spending, limit the production and trade of conventional weapons, and engage in discussions to create agreements on controlling arms. DISEC's role is vital in preventing the proliferation of WMDs, which include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. It does this by promoting and strengthening existing treaties like the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). These agreements help maintain global security by making it harder for countries to develop and use these dangerous weapons.² Furthermore, DISEC examines security challenges specific to various regions and works towards developing strategies to mitigate conflicts and promote stability. It focuses on regional disarmament efforts, confidence-building measures, and the prevention of arms races that could potentially destabilize a particular geographical area. Through its deliberations, DISEC seeks to foster a cooperative and collaborative approach to addressing security concerns and achieving a more peaceful world. During DISEC sessions, government representatives who participate in the committee play a significant role in shaping its agenda and discussions. They engage in dialogues, negotiations, and decision-making processes related to disarmament and international security issues. The contributions and perspectives of member states are crucial in shaping the outcomes and resolutions adopted by DISEC.

It is important to note that as a part of the General Assembly, DISEC faces certain constraints in its authority over sovereign states' affairs.³ Consequently, the resolutions it adopts lack legal enforceability. However, these resolutions hold international normative significance as they provide general guidelines for the expected conduct of nations. Therefore, it becomes imperative for each delegate to actively engage in critical analysis and discussions, aiming to establish a reliable global benchmark for disarmament and international security.

¹<https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text>

²<https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/unga>

³<https://www.un.org/en/ga/first/>

Topic 1 Overview - Reducing Biological and Chemical Weapons

Biological and chemical weapons fall under the category of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), a classification recognized by the United Nations Security Council,⁴ which includes atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical, and biological weapons, as well as any future weapons with comparable destructive capabilities to the atomic bomb or those mentioned above.⁵ The danger posed by WMDs is alarming due to their highly contagious nature and the swift harm they can inflict on humans, animals, and plants. Their ability to cross borders with ease amplifies the risks, making this threat even more significant. Deliberate releases of biological agents or toxins, whether by nations or non-state actors, have the potential to result in tragic loss of life, and widespread illness, instill fear and panic, induce food contamination, and create resource shortages. In some cases, such incidents can even trigger environmental disasters and severe economic crises. Therefore, there have been extensive efforts, both nationally and internationally, to prevent the utilization of WMDs.

The history of prohibiting the use of biological and chemical weapons dates back to the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, which initially banned their use in warfare.⁶ However, chemical weapons were deployed during World War I despite these prohibitions;⁷ In response, peace-seeking nations negotiated the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gasses, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (referred to as the "Geneva Protocol").⁸ Unfortunately, the Protocol proved ineffective, prompting intensified efforts to strengthen disarmament and prevent the use of chemical and biological weapons after World War II.

Despite these prohibitions, chemical weapons were still used during World War I, prompting peace-seeking nations to negotiate the Geneva Protocol. Unfortunately, the Protocol proved to be ineffective, leading to intensified efforts to strengthen disarmament and prevent the use of these weapons after World War II. It is clear that the dangers posed by these weapons are alarming, and there needs to be further efforts to prevent their utilization.

However, in recent years, there have been notable instances of the utilization of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). For instance, Syrian government forces are suspected to have employed the nerve agent sarin and chlorine bombs since 2013, resulting in the loss of innocent lives and the suffering of numerous civilians.⁹ Additionally, the Islamic State utilized mustard gas in Northern Iraq between 2015 and 2016,¹⁰ while at the same time, biological weapons are becoming easier to manufacture. As delegates of DISEC, it is becoming more and more urgent for you to find a solution that can target these dangerous WMDs and ensure the safety of your citizens from the use of such weapons.

⁴<https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/755665>

⁵<https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN10936>

⁶https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/WMD/Bio/pdf/Status_Protocol.pdf

⁷<https://www.britannica.com/technology/chemical-weapon>

⁸https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/treaties_1.pdf

⁹<https://www.state.gov/opcw-charges-syrian-regime-with-chemical-weapons-attack/>


¹⁰<https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-evolution-of-the-islamic-states-chemical-weapons-efforts/>

Current Situation

State Biological and Chemical Weapons Programs

Current chemical weapons activity, 2022

Chemical weapons are chemicals used to cause death or harm through their poisonous properties.



Source: OWID based on ACA (2022), NTI (2022), and CNS (2008).

OurWorldInData.org/biological-and-chemical-weapons • CC BY

Note: Information as of September 15, 2022. 'Allegedly' refers to situations where a country was charged by another country of pursuing or using chemical weapons, but the claims have not been confirmed by the country itself or impartial observers. 'Recent' use means within the last decade.

In the past century, the global community has exerted efforts to stop the proliferation of biological weapons. Despite these endeavors, the development and use of such weapons have persisted. Presently, the primary concern revolves around the existence of covert and unlawful programs pursued by various nations. It is believed that around 16 countries — including Canada, China, Cuba, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Libya, North Korea, Russia, South Africa, Syria, the United Kingdom, and the United States — have possessed or currently possess biological weapons.¹¹ However, due to the secrecy surrounding these programs, the actual number may be higher. The lack of mechanisms to hold countries accountable under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) has led to past violations and leaves room for potential violations today. Even a small and economically challenged country could establish a biological warfare program with a relatively modest investment of capital.

A notable example of this is the alleged existence of biolabs in Ukraine. In March 2022, Russian officials claimed that there were "secret U.S.-funded biolabs" purportedly developing biological weapons. This claim was echoed by China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chinese state media¹² and gained support from various politicians in the United States, including Tulsi Gabbard.¹³ In July 2022, two members of the Russian State Duma announced the findings of a biolabs commission investigation, stating that Ukraine had administered drugs to its soldiers that "completely neutralize the last traces of human consciousness and turn them into the most cruel and deadly monsters." They claimed that this was evidence of a system for controlling and creating a merciless killing machine implemented under the

¹¹<https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/2021-NTI-Annual-Report.pdf>

¹²<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202203/1255273.shtml>

¹³<https://www.newsweek.com/tulsi-gabbard-bio-labs-ukraine-russia-conspiracy-1687594>

management of the United States. In June 2022, the Russian Federation filed official questions to the United States under Article V of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) after presenting its own narrative through state media.¹⁴ The U.S. published its responses in August 2022, accusing Russia of numerous "mischaracterizations." The U.S. also asserted that the document sent by Russia did not contain actual questions but rather a series of "assertions" aimed at implying an unspecified sinister motive.¹⁵ As delegates of DISEC, you cannot invoke Article V of the BWC, as only the UNSC can do that. However, you can still investigate the presence of biolabs in Ukraine based on a technicality; the decision is yours to make.

Simultaneously, many nations persist in researching and stockpiling chemical weapon agents despite numerous attempts to reduce or eliminate them. The majority of states have joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which mandated the destruction of all chemical weapons by 2012. Twelve nations have declared production facilities for chemical weapons, and six nations have declared stockpiles of such weapons.¹⁶ After the treaty came into force, all the declared production facilities were destroyed or converted for civilian use. Out of the 190 nations that have signed the CWC, a few state parties have declared stockpiles and agreed to monitor disposal and verification, but in some cases, have used chemical weapons in conflicts.¹⁷ Both military targets and civilian populations have been affected, and at times, the affected populations were directly targeted.

Historically speaking, the use of chemical weapons has been popular among governments, and the popularity of chemical weapons can be dated back to the ancient Greeks. For example, despite international conventions banning the use of chemical weapons, there have been several instances where they were employed in various conflicts. In the mid-1930s, Italians used chemical weapons during the war in Ethiopia, and during World War II, the Japanese utilized them in China from 1938 to 1942. These chemical weapons were not limited to traditional agents, as new compounds like Sarin, Soman, and VX emerged following the discovery of Tabun in 1936, marking the development of nerve gasses. The Vietnam War, which took place from 1961 to 1973, saw accusations against the United States for using tear gas and heavy herbicides (defoliants) that had effects similar to chemical weapons. The classification of Napalm, a substance used during the conflict, varies among international organizations, with some considering it a chemical weapon and others equating it with flame throwers, thereby exempting it from the Chemical Weapons Convention. Another notable instance occurred during the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988, when Saddam Hussein's regime employed chemical weapons against both Iranian soldiers and Iraqi civilians. Mustard gas was among the chemicals used, resulting in the exposure of an estimated 45,000 people. These instances underscore the challenges and violations associated with the international prohibition of chemical weapons despite ongoing efforts to curb their use.

¹⁴<https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5469617>

¹⁵<https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Response-of-the-United-States-to-Questions-Posed-by-the-Russian-Federation.pdf>

¹⁶<https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2023/07/opcw-confirms-all-declared-chemical-weapons-stockpiles-verified>

¹⁷<https://www.polygraph.info/a/fact-check-china-idiosyncratic-reaction-to-us-irreversible-destruction-of-chemical-weapons-stockpile/7178207.html>

Programs by Non-State Actors

Despite the implementation of legislation and the endorsement of treaties, the international community is currently confronted with a significant apprehension regarding the potential deployment of biological weapons by terrorist organizations.¹⁸ The existence of such weapons under the control of these groups poses a distinctive and formidable hazard, as they operate outside the confines of international law and lack mechanisms for accountability comparable to those imposed on nation-states.¹⁹ While conventional acts of terrorism typically require extensive training, financing, equipment, and communication infrastructure, the utilization of biological weapons, although necessitating meticulous research and development for effective implementation, offers a cost-effective and profoundly destructive alternative that demands less manpower. Until recently, the production of biological weaponry was perceived as a complex endeavor exclusively within the realm of powerful states with advanced national programs.²⁰ Nevertheless, advancements in scientific innovation have substantially reduced costs and facilitated accessibility, granting non-state actors the means to engage in the development of biological warfare.

In one case, in a series of events between October and November 2003, two separate instances involved the discovery of letters contaminated with the highly toxic substance known as ricin. One of these letters, initially intended for the White House, was intercepted at a processing facility, while the other, lacking any specific recipient, was found in South Carolina.²¹ Furthermore, during February 2004, an incident involving ricin occurred at the Dirksen Senate Office Building, which was initially linked to the letters from 2003. These letters were attributed to an individual identifying themselves as "Fallen Angel". The sender, who claimed ownership of a trucking company, expressed vehement frustration over alterations in federal trucking regulations. However, despite ongoing investigations, no concrete connection has been established between the letters sent by Fallen Angel and the incident at the Dirksen building. To incentivize information that could aid in resolving the case, federal law enforcement agencies offered a reward of USD 100,000 in 2004. Remarkably, this reward remains unclaimed to this day.²²

At the same time, chemical programs pursued by non-state actors have emerged as a concerning issue in recent times. Non-state actors refer to entities that are not affiliated with recognized governments or nation-states.²³ These actors include terrorist organizations, insurgent groups, and other non-state entities that may seek to acquire and utilize chemical weapons for various purposes. The possession and development of chemical programs by non-state actors pose significant risks due to the potential for indiscriminate harm and the challenges associated with holding these actors accountable. Unlike states, non-state actors are not bound by international laws or treaties governing the use and proliferation of chemical weapons. This lack of accountability further compounds the dangers associated with their chemical programs. Non-state actors may pursue chemical weapons for several reasons. Some seek to cause mass casualties and spread fear among civilian populations, aiming to achieve political objectives or disrupt societal stability. Others may intend to retaliate against perceived adversaries or assert their influence through unconventional means.

¹⁸<https://www.britannica.com/technology/biological-weapon/Biological-terrorism>

¹⁹https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/5/4/99-0411_article

²⁰https://www.emedicinehealth.com/biological_warfare/article_em.htm

²¹<https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/pressrel/press-releases/ricin-letter>


²²<https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/ricin/fbi-offers-details-ricin-laced-letter-white-house>

²³<https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/cct/chemical-biological-radiological-and-nuclear-terrorism>

Instances of non-state actors utilizing or attempting to acquire chemical weapons have been documented. For example, in September 2015, the BBC reported statements from an unidentified U.S. official indicating that ISIS purportedly employed powdered mustard agent on multiple occasions in Syria and Iraq.²⁴ Allegedly, ISIS had likely manufactured the mustard agent independently and may have an active research team dedicated to chemical weapons. Manufacturing mustard agent is relatively straightforward, and considering the Syrian government's disarmament of chemical weapons, it was considered improbable that ISIS had obtained the agent by seizing stockpiles from the Syrian government. The BBC also highlighted supporting evidence observed by a team situated on the Turkey-Syria border.²⁵

Past Involvement

Members of each ABC / NBC weapons agreement 2018



The graph shows the number of members of each NBC arms control agreement (early 2018).

Sources: UNODA 2018, OPCW 2018, CTBTO 2018

Geneva Protocol (1925)

The Geneva Protocol also referred to as the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gasses, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, is an international treaty designed to forbid the utilization of chemical and biological weapons in international conflicts. This significant agreement was signed on June 17, 1925, in Geneva and took effect on February 8, 1928. It builds upon the principles outlined in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and extends the Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War.²⁶

The primary objective of the protocol is to explicitly ban the use of "asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gasses, and of all analogous liquids, materials, or devices," as well as "bacteriological methods of

²⁴<https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/6B824CDE0E25FD86AC3D0BD07822A743/S1867299X17000356a.pdf/past-as-prologue-the-risk-of-adoption-of-chemical-and-biological-weapons-by-non-state-actors-in-the-eu.pdf>

²⁵<https://www.cnn.com/2015/08/13/politics/isis-mustard-gas-chemical-weapons/index.html>

²⁶<https://www.britannica.com/event/Geneva-Gas-Protocol>

warfare." By doing so, it effectively prohibits the deployment of chemical and biological weapons during armed conflicts. The use of such weapons are considered to be particularly inhumane due to their potential to cause widespread and indiscriminate suffering and death.

However, limitations of the protocol became evident shortly after the Geneva Conference. Several major powers, including the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, explicitly reserved the right to use the prohibited weapons for retaliatory purposes. This meant that if a state chose to use chemical or bacteriological weapons against another country in complete defiance of the protocol's stipulations, the attacked country would legally be allowed to respond in kind. Additionally, the 1925 document failed to address the production, storage, testing, and transfer of the forbidden weapons. This allowed countries such as the Soviet Union and the United States to amass large supplies of chemical and bacteriological agents.

Despite its obvious inadequacies, the protocol remains the legal foundation for a long series of multilateral treaties dealing with the threat that weapons such as mustard gas and anthrax represent. The limitations of the protocol have highlighted the need for further efforts to address these issues and enhance global security against the use and proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. Subsequent treaties, such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1993, were introduced to address some of these concerns and strengthen the international framework against the use of such weapons.

1975 Biological Weapons Convention

The United Nations established the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) on March 26, 1975, representing a significant milestone in global disarmament efforts. This historic treaty stands as the first multilateral agreement to comprehensively ban an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, specifically targeting biological and toxin weapons, thereby prohibiting their development, production, and use.²⁷

The BWC lays down several critical obligations for its parties to adhere to. Among these obligations is the prohibition of engaging in activities such as developing, stockpiling, acquiring, retaining, and producing biological agents and toxins without legitimate justification for peaceful purposes.²⁸ Additionally, states are barred from developing weapons, equipment, and delivery vehicles with the intent of using such agents or toxins in armed conflicts. Another crucial aspect of the BWC is the prohibition of transferring biological weapons-related materials and technologies. Parties must ensure that agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and delivery vehicles that could be utilized for hostile purposes are not transferred. Effective cooperation among states is essential in monitoring and regulating such transfers to ensure compliance with the Convention's provisions.

One of the BWC's notable achievements is the establishment of a strong global norm against biological weapons. The treaty's preamble emphasizes that the use of such weapons is morally

²⁷<https://disarmament.unoda.org/biological-weapons/>

²⁸<https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/convention-prohibition-development-production-and-stockpiling-bacteriological-biological-and-toxin-weapons-btwc/>

unacceptable to humanity. Presently, no country openly declares possessing or seeking biological weapons, and there is no argument for their legitimate use in warfare. The rapid progress in biotechnology makes the BWC a crucial arms control treaty for the 21st century. However, its effectiveness has been hindered by the lack of robust institutional support and a formal verification mechanism to ensure compliance.²⁹

Although the BWC is legally binding, there have been past instances of violations, such as the actions of the Soviet Union before its dissolution³⁰ and Iraq's violations after the Persian Gulf War.³¹ These cases highlight the need for implementing strong mechanisms to enhance transparency, verification, and enforcement. Such measures are necessary to discourage non-compliance and hold states accountable for their actions, ultimately strengthening the BWC's effectiveness in achieving its noble goals of global disarmament and preventing the use of biological and toxin weapons.

1992 Chemical Weapons Convention

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is a pivotal international treaty that seeks to completely eradicate the use, development, and possession of chemical weapons worldwide. Unlike its predecessor, the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which solely prohibited the use of chemical weapons but allowed countries to retain them, the CWC takes a more comprehensive and stringent approach. Its overarching goal is to eliminate all forms of chemical warfare and to prevent the proliferation of such deadly weapons. The implementation and oversight of the CWC are entrusted to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), headquartered in The Hague, Netherlands. This specialized international organization comprises a dedicated team of around 500 professionals working tirelessly to ensure the treaty's effective enforcement. States that are parties to the CWC are required to provide detailed declarations to the OPCW, disclosing information about their chemical weapons-related activities and any relevant industrial operations. These declarations form the basis for the OPCW's monitoring and inspection activities.³²

Through a combination of routine inspections, verification measures, and information exchange, the OPCW verifies compliance with the CWC's provisions. Inspectors from the OPCW have the authority to visit declared chemical facilities to ascertain their compliance with the treaty's obligations.³³ The OPCW's efforts play a crucial role in instilling confidence among member states that all parties are abiding by the treaty's commitments.

However, despite the CWC's noble objectives and the vigilant efforts of the OPCW, there have been notable instances of non-compliance with the treaty. One of the most glaring examples is Iraq, which flagrantly developed and employed chemical weapons, including deadly mustard gas and nerve agents, during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s and against its own Kurdish population in appalling acts of chemical warfare.³⁴ Another deeply concerning case is Syria, where the government forces have been

²⁹<https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/153567601001500303>

³⁰<https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/alibek63.pdf>

³¹<https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/9244334/>

³²<https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance>

³³<https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/articles/article-i>

³⁴<https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/2021-Condition-10-c-Report.pdf>

found responsible for the use of chemical agents, such as sarin and chlorine bombs, causing immeasurable civilian suffering and loss of life during the protracted Syrian Civil War.³⁵ These unfortunate violations underscore the ongoing challenges in ensuring universal adherence to the CWC's principles and provisions. They also emphasize the importance of continued international efforts and cooperation to prevent the use and proliferation of chemical weapons. The OPCW's unwavering commitment to verifying compliance and investigating allegations of chemical weapons use remains critical in deterring potential violators and holding accountable those who defy the treaty's ban on these indiscriminate and inhumane weapons.

In a world striving for peace and security, the CWC stands as a testament to the global commitment to eliminating chemical weapons and promoting a safer and more stable international community. While challenges persist, the dedication of the international community and the steadfast work of the OPCW offer hope for a future free from the scourge of chemical warfare.

The United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission

The establishment of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) through the adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 1284 on December 17, 1999, marked a significant milestone in the collective effort to address Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Building upon the groundwork laid by its predecessor, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), UNMOVIC took on the crucial mission of disarmament, focusing on Iraq's WMDs. Its main objective was to ensure Iraq's compliance with the disarmament obligations outlined by the Security Council and prevent any reacquisition or development of prohibited weapons. With the backing of the United Nations, UNMOVIC carried out an array of comprehensive inspections, investigations, and assessments to evaluate Iraq's adherence to its disarmament commitments. Employing various verification techniques, including on-site visits, interviews, scrutiny of documents, and scientific examinations, the commission diligently collected evidence and closely monitored Iraq's progress in disarming.³⁶ Operating in a complex and challenging environment, UNMOVIC encountered numerous hurdles in its pursuit of verifying and enforcing Iraq's disarmament obligations. These challenges encompassed restrictions imposed by the Iraqi government that limited access to certain sites, the intricacies of evaluating Iraq's declarations, and the potential concealment of activities related to WMDs.

Despite the obstacles encountered, UNMOVIC played a vital role under the auspices of the United Nations in the concerted global endeavor to address Iraq's WMD programs. Its work was driven by the shared objective of eliminating Iraq's WMD capabilities and preventing any resurgence of such programs that could pose a threat to regional and international security.³⁷ The mission of UNMOVIC spanned several years, culminating in June 2007. While it faced limitations and unresolved issues, the commission stood as a testament to the collaborative international efforts aimed at addressing Iraq's WMD programs and safeguarding global peace and stability.³⁸

³⁵https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/2023_10C_Report_Unclassified_FINAL.pdf

³⁶<https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-Nations-Monitoring-Verification-and-Inspection-Commission>

³⁷<https://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/>

³⁸<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/abs/known-unknowns-power-shifts-uncertainty-and-war/93860929449484112FDCC5F213C8BE16>

UN Security Council Resolution 1540

United Nations Security Council resolution 1540, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, addresses the critical issue of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). It acknowledges that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, along with their means of delivery, poses a significant threat to international peace and security. Notably, resolution 1540 is only the second resolution to invoke Chapter VII without relating the fact to a specific time and place. The first one was United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, passed after the September 11 attacks to counter international terrorism. The connection between terrorism and access to WMDs was already considered in Resolution 1373, and UNSC Resolution 1540 emerged from these deliberations. Additionally, resolution 1540 highlights the significance of existing non-proliferation and disarmament agreements. To oversee the implementation of the resolution, the 1540 Committee was established, and states are required to provide reports to the committee on their progress in fulfilling the obligations within six months of the resolution's adoption.³⁹

The resolution establishes three main obligations for all member states:⁴⁰


1. Refrain from providing any support to non-state actors attempting to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer, or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery.
2. Adopt and enforce effective laws that prohibit non-state actors from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, transferring, or using WMDs and their means of delivery.
3. Take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls that prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery.

Unlike other resolutions, the 1540 Committee does not possess the power to impose sanctions. Instead, the implementation process is based on collaboration and participation, with the committee acting as a "clearing house" for offers and requests for assistance in meeting the resolution's obligations. Although the resolution is obligatory for all UN member states, the emphasis is on cooperation rather than enforcement. Consequently, some states took longer to submit their reports and make progress in fulfilling their obligations.

Case Study - Syria

³⁹<https://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/1540-fact-sheet.shtml>

⁴⁰<http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1540>



Amidst the backdrop of the Syrian Civil War, which commenced in 2011, a disturbing trend emerged with numerous documented incidents of chemical weapons attacks beginning in 2012. The credibility of these attacks was verified by respected international bodies like the United Nations, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and Human Rights Watch. Various regions in Syria, including Khan al-Assal, Jobar, Saraqib, Ashrafiyat Sahnaya, Kafr Zita, Talmenes, Sarmin, and Douma, bore witness to the horror of these devastating assaults. The most harrowing among them were the sarin attack in Ghouta in August 2013, the sarin attack in Khan Shaykhun in April 2017, and the Douma chemical attacks in April 2018.⁴¹

Conclusive investigations allege that both the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad and ISIL militants resorted to chemical weapons, with the majority of attacks attributed to the Syrian government. The gravity of the situation led the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission to declare in 2014 that the use of chlorine was not sporadic but rather widespread and systematic.⁴² Subsequent investigations by the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (OPCW-UN JIM) pointed fingers at the Syrian government for the Khan Shaykhun sarin attack and several chlorine attacks, while ISIL was found to have used sulfur mustard.

In response to the alarming use of chemical weapons, international pressure mounted on the Syrian Armed Forces to dismantle their chemical arsenal, and this process was successfully completed in June 2014. Nevertheless, suspected incidents of chemical weapons use continued to occur, with accusations directed at various groups, including Syrian Ba'athist forces, ISIL, Syrian opposition forces, and Turkish Armed Forces.

⁴¹<https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/507321.aspx>

⁴²<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/21/people-foaming-at-the-mouth-10-years-since-chemical-attacks-in-ghouta>

On 4th April 2017, a tragic chemical attack occurred in the Syrian town of Khan Shaykhun in the Idlib Governorate.⁴³ The attack involved an airstrike allegedly by Syrian government forces followed by the release of a toxic gas, likely sarin or a similar substance. As a result, at least 89 people lost their lives, and more than 541 individuals were injured, according to reports from the opposition Idlib Health Directorate. This incident marked the deadliest use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war since the notorious Ghouta chemical attack in 2013. The responsibility for the Khan Shaykhun attack was assigned to the Syrian government by the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism. The investigation revealed specific chemicals in the area that linked the sarin used to the Syrian government's stockpile. Several governments, such as the United States, United Kingdom, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, France, and Israel, along with Human Rights Watch, held Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's forces responsible for the attack. However, the Syrian government vehemently denied these accusations, dismissing the event as a fabrication, and the Russian government claimed it was staged. The Khan Shaykhun attack's complex and conflicting narratives highlight the challenges in determining responsibility in such tragic and contentious incidents.

Another chemical warfare attack occurred in the city of Douma on 7 April 2018, allegedly carried out by the forces of the government of Bashar al-Assad. Medics and witnesses reported that the attack caused the deaths of between 40 and 50 people and left over 100 individuals injured.⁴⁴ This incident was attributed to the Syrian Army by rebel forces in Douma and by the governments of the United States, Britain, and France. In response to the seriousness of the attack, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) conducted a two-year-long investigation. In January 2023, the investigation concluded that the Syrian Air Force was responsible for perpetuating the chemical attacks during their military campaign in Douma. Both Russia and Syria strongly refuted these claims and denied any use of chemical substances, dismissing the reports as unfounded and labeling them as "bogus." In the aftermath of the attack, international discussions took divergent paths. Media outlets in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France primarily engaged in debates concerning the airstrikes that were conducted in response to the attack. The focus was on questioning the effectiveness and legitimacy of these military actions. Interestingly, public opinion in these countries tended to lean towards supporting the decision to carry out the airstrikes. On the other side, Russian and Chinese media presented an entirely different narrative. They portrayed the aftermath of the alleged attack as part of a larger scheme orchestrated by the American and British governments. This portrayal sought to shift the blame away from the Syrian government and towards the accusers, creating a narrative of suspicion and mistrust.⁴⁵

The Khan Shaykhun chemical attack in April 2017 and the Douma chemical attack in April 2018 triggered military actions from the United States, United Kingdom, and France, targeting Syrian government-controlled facilities. The gravity of the issue culminated in Syria's OPCW membership suspension in April 2021, following the allegation of the Assad regime's failure to disclose its chemical weapon stockpiles and its breach of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

⁴³<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/04/syria-chemical-attack-idlib-province>

⁴⁴<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43697084>

⁴⁵<https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/syria-opcw-douma-chemical-attack-1.6728066>

Before September 2013, the Syrian government had not publicly acknowledged possessing chemical weapons. Nonetheless, Western intelligence services believed that Syria held one of the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons in the world.⁴⁶ The revelations of Syria's chemical weapons arsenal heightened global anxiety and sparked efforts to eliminate these dangerous capabilities. However, despite the disarmament process, further incidents of chemical weapons use were reported during the conflict, attributing the use to various factions involved in the war. The destruction of declared chemical weapons represented a positive step, but the persistence of chemical attacks underscored the complexities and challenges of fully eradicating such weaponry from the conflict. The use of chemical weapons continued to be a grave violation of international norms and resulted in widespread condemnation from the international community.⁴⁷

Case Study - Project Coast

The South African chemical weapons program conducted extensive research on various standard chemical warfare (CW) agents, including irritant riot control agents, lethal nerve agents, and anticholinergic deliriant. However, what set the South African program apart from many other countries' CBW programs was its unique focus on developing nonlethal agents to suppress internal dissent. This led to the investigation of unconventional nonlethal agents, which included illicit recreational drugs such as phencyclidine, MDMA, methaqualone, and cocaine, as well as medicinal drugs like diazepam, midazolam, ketamine, suxamethonium, and tubocurarine, intending to develop potential incapacitating agents.⁴⁸

According to the testimony provided by Wouter Basson during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the program involved the preparation and study of analogs of these compounds. Notably, large quantities of methaqualone and MDMA, along with the deliriant BZ, were successfully weaponized into a fine dust or aerosol form that could potentially be released over a crowd for riot control purposes.⁴⁹ Shockingly, it was later revealed that Basson had been selling significant quantities of MDMA and methaqualone tablets on the black market. While some of the manufactured drugs were indeed sold, the court acknowledged that a considerable portion was dedicated to genuine weaponization and testing.

Furthermore, the South African program delved into researching a black mamba and its venom, as well as genetically modifying *E. coli* O157:H7 bacteria to produce some of the toxins created by *Clostridium perfringens* bacteria.⁵⁰ A range of alarming materials was listed in the program's documents, including biological agents such as anthrax, brucellosis, cholera, and salmonella, and various chemicals like aluminum phosphide, thallium acetate, sodium azide, sodium cyanide, mercury oxycyanide, cantharides, colchicine, potent anticoagulants like brodifacoum, phenyl silatranes, strychnine, paraquat, "knockout drops," digoxin, acetylcholinesterase inhibitors such as aldicarb and paraoxon, and other deadly poisons.

⁴⁶<https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity>

⁴⁷https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/worries-intensify-over-syrian-chemical-weapons/2012/09/06/13889aac-f841-11e1-8253-3f495ae70650_story_1.html

⁴⁸<https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/73gould.pdf>

⁴⁹<https://www.theblackvault.com/documentarchive/project-coast/>

⁵⁰https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/145221/2002_ProjectCoase_en.pdf

The South African chemical weapons program's endeavors revealed a disturbing array of research into unconventional and dangerous agents, highlighting the far-reaching and morally ambiguous nature of its operations.

Potential Solutions

Setting Monitoring Measures

Current prevention strategies do not guarantee the prevention of the use of biological and chemical weapons. The proliferation of such weapons of mass destruction is evident, and international legislation like the Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) lacks specific enforcement and accountability measures. The challenge lies in detecting secretive biological weapons programs, leading to suspicions without confirmed evidence.

To address this issue, delegates are encouraged to consider implementing mechanisms to hold states accountable under the Geneva Protocol and BWC. One proposal is creating bodies akin to the 1540 Committee or UNMOVIC at an international level, tasked with monitoring biotechnology research and biodefense programs to ensure compliance with international laws. Specialized forces or committees could improve the international community's ability to detect potential violations. Another suggested measure involves establishing international databases promoting transparency among nations. These databases would require countries to share some information about their biodefense and biotechnology research, fostering cooperation and better risk assessment. However, one potential drawback of the database solution is the possibility of some countries refusing to cooperate, especially those accused of possessing biological weapons or being heavily involved in biotechnology. Privacy and national sovereignty concerns might hinder their participation. Therefore, careful discussions within the General Assembly are necessary to strike a balance between promoting accountability and respecting individual nations' sovereignty.

The issue of chemical weapons is also a critical concern in the context of international legislation, particularly the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The CWC is an arms control treaty that aims to eliminate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction by prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. Similar to the challenges faced in the context of biological weapons, the CWC also lacks sufficient enforcement and accountability measures within the treaty itself. While nations may face consequences if they are found to possess or use chemical weapons, detecting and confirming the presence of such weapons can be a complex and challenging process. To address this issue, delegates should consider implementing mechanisms to improve accountability under the CWC, much like the proposals discussed earlier in the context of biological weapons. Creating specialized bodies or committees tasked with monitoring chemical weapons-related activities and compliance with the CWC can help enhance detection capabilities and provide a more robust enforcement mechanism. Additionally, fostering transparency among nations through international databases that share information on chemical weapons research, stockpiles, and other related activities could also be considered. Such databases may help build trust and cooperation among states and facilitate the identification of potential violators. As with the biological weapons issue, there might be concerns from certain countries about participating in databases due to issues of privacy and national sovereignty. These

concerns would need to be addressed through careful negotiations and discussions within the international community.

The combination of addressing both biological and chemical weapons issues, along with the respective conventions (BWC and CWC), is crucial to strengthening global efforts to prevent the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction. By implementing effective accountability measures, the international community can work towards a safer world and prevent the misuse of such devastating weapons.

Establishing Regulations on Research

Many national research programs that involve chemical and biological weaponry often operate in a legal gray area, creating opportunities for potential cover-ups of offensive biological and chemical weapons development. To prevent violations of international codes, the international community needs to establish baseline regulations on biodefense and chemical defense programs. The General Assembly can debate the extent to which these programs should exist and operate, considering various factors. One approach to regulation could involve limiting the testing of pathogens and experimentation with the application of biological and chemical agents. These measures aim to strike a balance between maintaining biodefense and chemical defense capabilities for countering bioterrorism and chemical threats while preventing the misuse of such research for offensive purposes. Alongside regulations, robust accountability measures are crucial. Continuous monitoring of nations' activities will be necessary to ensure compliance with the established regulations. To enhance overall knowledge of biological and chemical agents and monitor compliance, the creation of an international database should be considered. This database would facilitate information sharing among nations and increase transparency, contributing to the collective effort to prevent the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. While this solution is vital for curbing the spread of biological and chemical weapons, it is not without challenges. Biotechnology and biodefense research, as well as chemical defense programs, play a significant role in developing strategies to counter potential bioterrorism and chemical threats. Additionally, some countries heavily invest in these areas, leading to concerns about compliance with regulations and potential conflicts with national sovereignty. Addressing these concerns will be crucial during committee sessions and requires careful negotiation and cooperation among member states.

Formulating Response Strategies

The primary obstacle in dealing with bioterrorism, chemical terrorism, and terrorism in general stems from the elusive and unpredictable nature of terrorist groups, often operating outside international law. Consequently, the most prudent approach to mitigate potential harm is to concentrate on defensive measures. This entails devising response strategies that can minimize the impact of biological or chemical attacks on populations and ideally prevent such attacks altogether. Effectively addressing these threats requires investments in researching various pathogens and chemical agents. Understanding their modes of transmission and effects is critical, as it enables the development of effective methods to detect and respond to bioterrorism and chemical attacks. Moreover, educating the public about biological and chemical weapons is vital to avoid mass panic and hysteria. However, it's important to note that the specifics of response strategies depend on the General Assembly's deliberation and discussion. While this approach is crucial for citizen safety, it does present certain drawbacks. Implementing effective response

strategies demands substantial investment in biological and chemical weapons research, which may clash with efforts to limit controversial programs like the United States' biodefense and chemical defense initiatives. Hence, it is up to the General Assembly to determine the extent to which national research and development programs can be maintained without violating international legislation while countering the dual threats of bioterrorism and chemical terrorism.

Discussion Questions

1. Does your nation currently possess any chemical or biological weapons, and do they currently have a program in the development of WMDs?
2. How does your nation perceive the threats posed by bioweapons and chemical weapons to its national security?
3. What is your nation's stance on international agreements and treaties related to the prohibition of bioweapons and chemical weapons?
4. How does your nation ensure its own compliance with these agreements and promote global compliance?
5. Is your nation currently in the midst of a war, and if so, are they currently utilizing biological or chemical weapons?

Topic 2 Overview - Tensions in the Korean Peninsula

North Korea, officially recognized as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), set forth on a course of nuclear armament, a matter of significant unease for the global community. Across time, North Korea's pursuit of nuclear proficiency has drawn sanctions, diplomatic negotiations, and sporadic displays of military might. The DPRK's nuclear journey commenced in the 20th century, involving endeavors to develop both plutonium and uranium-based weaponry.⁵¹ Despite international pressure and rebuke, North Korea executed its inaugural nuclear test in 2006, inciting widespread alarm. Consequent tests in the ensuing years showcased their progressively expanding nuclear prowess.⁵²

The partition of the Korean Peninsula into North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) and South Korea (Republic of Korea) after World War II laid the groundwork for persistent tensions. The Korean War (1950-1953) exacerbated these tensions, as North Korea, backed by China and the Soviet Union, and South Korea, supported by the United States and its allies, engaged in a brutal conflict that culminated in an armistice rather than a formal peace treaty. This left the two Koreas technically in a state of war and the peninsula bisected by the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Nevertheless, in recent times, with the surge in missile trials and nuclear aspirations, apprehensions about stability and security in the region have gained global attention.⁵³

In defiance of international pressure and a series of United Nations Security Council resolutions, North Korea chose a path of nuclear enrichment and missile advancement. North Korea's nuclear trials, especially its sixth experiment in September 2017, showcased strides in its nuclear program.⁵⁴ Assertions of developing a hydrogen bomb and successful assessments of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) escalated concerns concerning the nation's nuclear capabilities. While North Korea had achieved the capability to miniaturize nuclear warheads for compatibility with missiles, uncertainties persisted about their re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere.⁵⁵ The situation is further entangled by the presence of around 29,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea and reports of U.S. nuclear weapons being stored in the country, which North Korea perceives as a direct security peril. Simultaneously, South Korea and the United States have executed an array of defensive measures, including military deployments and the implementation of systems such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea.⁵⁶

Recently, both North and South Korea have fortified their military preparedness and engaged in provocative maneuvers. North Korea's missile experimentation and advancements in solid-fuel technology underscored its commitment to augmenting its military capabilities. In the meantime, South Korea, under President Yoon's guidance, pursued military collaboration with the United States and took steps to reinforce its missile defense capabilities.

⁵¹<https://time.com/4692045/north-korea-nuclear-weapons-history/>

⁵²<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-korea-sanctions-un-nuclear-weapons>

⁵³<https://news.usni.org/2017/09/01/timeline-brief-history-north-korean-nuclear-weapon-development>


⁵⁴<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/19/north-korea-expanding-weapons-grade-uranium-plant-satellite-images-suggest>

⁵⁵<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/04/28/north-korea-missile-advances-nuclear/>

⁵⁶<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-09-19/satellite-shows-north-korea-nuclear-facility-expanding/100474072>

With the escalating developments in the Korean Peninsula, the international community now grapples with the complex challenge of how to effectively manage and respond to this evolving threat, seeking solutions that can safeguard peace and stability on a global scale.

Current Situation



The current state of the Korean nuclear crisis has been significantly shaped by pivotal developments that have heightened concerns and escalated tensions on both regional and global fronts. Notably, a pivotal agreement reached in April between the United States and South Korea signifies a marked shift in their collaborative approach to nuclear weapons planning.⁵⁷ This accord has arisen amid statements made by South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, hinting at the possibility of South Korea pursuing an independent nuclear arsenal. The gravity of this agreement is underlined by President Biden's stern warning, reflecting the world's deep-rooted anxieties about the evolving crisis.

The cessation of North Korea's nuclear tests remained in effect until 2022, followed by a worrisome increase in missile launches. The year 2023 witnessed North Korea's successful development and testing of its first solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), named the Hwasong-18.⁵⁸ This technological advancement allows for quicker launches and improved concealment, posing a significant challenge to preemptive strike strategies. The trajectory of a missile over Japan marked a departure from events in 2017,⁵⁹ and a record-breaking twenty-three missile tests conducted in a single day in November 2022 showcased North Korea's unyielding determination. Diplomatically, meetings between Kim Jong Un and high-ranking Chinese and Russian delegations in July 2023 underscored a resurgence in bilateral relations.⁶⁰

⁵⁷<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-65404805>

⁵⁸<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-60860441>

⁵⁹<https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/04/asia/north-korea-missile-japan-explainer-intl-hnk/index.html>

⁶⁰<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/north-korea-kim-jong-un-russia-china-missiles-korea-war-armistice-anniversary/>

Simultaneously, the policy review introduced by the Joe Biden administration in 2021 introduced a nuanced strategy towards North Korea, blending diplomacy and deterrence.⁶¹ This approach, exemplified by U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan's declaration in July 2023 of a willingness to engage in talks "without preconditions," contrasts with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's stance. South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol has adopted a more resolute position compared to his predecessor, pivoting towards enhanced military cooperation with the United States. This is evident in the relocation of the THAAD missile defense system to bolster operational readiness. Yoon's initiatives also extend to strengthening relations with Japan, reciprocated by Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.⁶² A pivotal event on the horizon is the standalone trilateral summit scheduled for August 2023, involving Biden, Kishida, and Yoon, which aims to cement strategic cooperation among these nations.

Within this evolving landscape, both North and South Korea have displayed reduced inclinations for compromise, resulting in heightened military posturing, readiness, and the reinforcement of critical alliances. These dynamics have added intricate layers to an already complex Korean nuclear crisis, necessitating immediate attention and diplomatic endeavors to prevent further escalation. The evolving nature of North Korea's policy on nuclear weapon usage further contributes to the complexity, as the nation's prior stance of avoiding preemptive strikes shifted in 2022.⁶³ This shift was brought about by a new law passed by the Supreme People's Assembly, indicating that nuclear attacks against an adversary would be automatically launched if there's an attack on North Korea's top leadership or its nuclear command and control system. Notably, the law also outlines the transfer of nuclear strike authorization to a senior official in the event of Kim Jong Un's incapacitation. This change introduces an element of unpredictability to an already tense situation.⁶⁴

Foreign Intervention and Involvement In the Korean Peninsula Crisis (In North Korea)

China, as North Korea's neighbor and historical ally, has a significant stake in the Korean Peninsula crisis. China has maintained economic and diplomatic ties with the DPRK and has been a key player in facilitating diplomatic discussions.⁶⁵ China has advocated for stability on the Korean Peninsula and has called for denuclearization through diplomatic means. Its position and influence in the region have been instrumental in shaping the dynamics of the crisis. At the same time, China and North Korea maintain a mutual aid and cooperation treaty that was signed in 1961.⁶⁶ This treaty is of significant importance, as it is currently the only defense treaty that either country has with any other nation. This treaty underscores the depth of the relationship between China and North Korea and commits both countries to provide mutual assistance in the event of aggression or threat from an external party. It has historically been a factor in regional security considerations. Additionally, during the COVID-19 pandemic, China provided humanitarian assistance and vaccine supplies to North Korea, indicating

⁶¹<https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-rollout-of-the-biden-administrations-north-korea-policy-review-leaves-unanswered-questions/>

⁶²<https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3155903/risking-chinas-wrath-south-korean-presidential-front-runner-yoon>

⁶³<https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/the-troubling-new-changes-north-koreas-nuclear-doctrine>

⁶⁴<https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/IF10472.pdf>

⁶⁵<https://www.cfr.org/background/china-north-korea-relationship>

⁶⁶<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202107/1228071.shtml>

China's role as a key partner in addressing health crises and providing support to North Korea amid global challenges.⁶⁷

Russia has also been involved in the Korean Peninsula crisis, albeit to a lesser extent than some other countries. Russia has maintained diplomatic relations with North Korea and has participated in multilateral talks on the Korean Peninsula issue.⁶⁸ While not as actively engaged as China or the United States, Russia's stance and diplomatic efforts can influence regional developments. Russia's relationship with North Korea has deep historical roots dating back to the Soviet era. During that period, the USSR was a major ally and benefactor of North Korea. This historical relationship has influenced diplomatic interactions and regional dynamics in more recent times. As of 2023, U.S. intelligence revealed that Russia and North Korea were engaged in discussions over a possible arms deal.⁶⁹ This development raises concerns about regional security and stability. Such meetings and potential arms agreements could have significant implications for the balance of power in the region and the ongoing Korean Peninsula crisis.⁷⁰

Foreign Intervention and Involvement In the Korean Peninsula Crisis (In South Korea)

The United States has played a significant role in the Korean Peninsula crisis due to its military presence in South Korea. The U.S. maintains a substantial number of troops stationed in South Korea as a deterrent against potential aggression from North Korea. Moreover, the U.S. has been actively engaged in diplomatic efforts to address the North Korean nuclear issue. This involvement has included negotiations and summits between U.S. leaders and North Korean leadership, aimed at achieving denuclearization and promoting peace in the region. The relationship between the United States and South Korea has been primarily focused on North Korea policy coordination. The Biden Administration has pursued a "calibrated, practical approach that is open to and will explore diplomacy with North Korea"⁷¹. This approach reflects a willingness to engage in diplomatic efforts to address the Korean Peninsula crisis and promote stability in the region. The United States and South Korea are bound by the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, which was signed in 1953.⁷² This treaty commits the United States to assist South Korea in defending itself, particularly from North Korea. As part of this commitment, approximately 28,500 U.S. troops are stationed in South Korea. These troops serve as a deterrent against potential aggression and contribute to the defense of South Korea in the event of a security threat from North Korea. This treaty underscores the United States' long-standing commitment to South Korea's security and regional stability.⁷³

Japan has expressed security concerns related to North Korea's missile tests and nuclear program. Japan has supported international efforts aimed at addressing the crisis and has taken steps to enhance its own defense capabilities.⁷⁴ Japan's proximity to the Korean Peninsula and its alliance with the United

⁶⁷<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-northkorea-china-idUSKBN28B3C9>

⁶⁸<https://web.archive.org/web/20160612170831/http://tass.ru/en/politics/860637>

⁶⁹<https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/30/europe/russia-north-korea-advancing-arms-deal-intl/index.html>

⁷⁰<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/16/north-korea-russia-kim-putin-friendship/>

⁷¹<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/biden-administration-has-completed-north-korea-policy-review-white-house-2021-04-30/>

⁷²https://www.usfk.mil/Portals/105/Documents/SOFA/H_Mutual%20Defense%20Treaty_1953.pdf

⁷³https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/fp_20160713_korea_alliance1.pdf

⁷⁴<https://www.jagranjosh.com/general-knowledge/japan-north-korea-relations-1648111323-1>

States make it an important regional player with a vested interest in regional stability.⁷⁵ Japan is a significant ally of the United States and is considered a regional power in East Asia. As a result, Japan has a vested interest in the resolution of the Korean nuclear crisis due to its proximity to the Korean Peninsula and the potential security implications for the region. Japan has actively participated in diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving the crisis, including its involvement in the Six-Party Talks, a multilateral dialogue involving North Korea, South Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia.⁷⁶ Japan has also supported international sanctions against North Korea as a means of pressuring the DPRK to denuclearize and comply with international norms.⁷⁷

Past Involvement

Agreed Framework

The Agreed Framework, signed on October 21, 1994, between the United States and North Korea, stands as a pivotal diplomatic accord that sought to address the escalating nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula.⁷⁸ At the heart of this landmark agreement was the shared objective of halting North Korea's suspected covert nuclear weapons program through a series of reciprocal commitments and incentives provided by both parties. With tensions and concerns mounting, the Agreed Framework emerged as a critical effort to stave off the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region and prevent further deterioration of stability.

Central to the Agreed Framework were several key provisions that aimed to curb North Korea's nuclear ambitions. Foremost among these was the commitment from North Korea to freeze the operation and construction of nuclear reactors located at its Yongbyon complex.⁷⁹ Notably, this freeze encompassed a 5-megawatt reactor and associated facilities suspected of being integral to North Korea's nuclear weapons program. By effectively suspending plutonium production capabilities, a primary material for nuclear weapons, the agreement sought to contain the immediate threat posed by North Korea's nuclear pursuits.⁸⁰

In return for North Korea's compliance with freezing its nuclear reactors, the United States and its allies, including South Korea and Japan, pledged a set of inducements aimed at fostering stability and cooperation. A key component of these incentives was the commitment to provide North Korea with two proliferation-resistant light-water nuclear power reactors. These reactors were designed to fulfill North Korea's energy needs while reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation, a move intended to encourage North Korea's shift toward peaceful and civilian applications of nuclear technology.⁸¹

⁷⁵https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/relation.html

⁷⁶<https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/explaining-the-impasse-in-japans-relations-with-north-korea/>

⁷⁷Ibid

⁷⁸<https://www.britannica.com/event/Agreed-Framework>

⁷⁹<https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/16/politics/north-korea-yongbyon-expansion-satellite-images/index.html>

⁸⁰<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-58380547>

⁸¹<https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/agreedframework>

Furthermore, the Agreed Framework held broader objectives aimed at transforming the geopolitical landscape of the Korean Peninsula. Alongside the technical provisions related to nuclear facilities, the agreement envisioned the normalization of economic and political relations between North Korea and the international community. This encompassed steps such as the reduction of barriers to investment, the establishment of liaison offices, and the eventual exchange of ambassadors, signaling a potential path toward enhanced diplomatic engagement.

However, while the Agreed Framework was hailed as a crucial breakthrough in curbing North Korea's nuclear ambitions, its long-term success remained uncertain. Over the years, implementation challenges, suspicions, and shifting geopolitical dynamics tested the sustainability of the agreement.⁸² Ultimately, the Agreed Framework faced setbacks, and negotiations over North Korea's nuclear program evolved into a more complex multilateral process known as the Six-Party Talks, which included additional regional players such as China and Russia.

In retrospect, the Agreed Framework serves as a testament to the complexities of addressing nuclear proliferation through diplomatic means. While it succeeded in temporarily freezing North Korea's plutonium production capabilities and placing its facilities under international safeguards, the evolving nature of the North Korean regime and the intricacies of international relations ultimately shaped the trajectory of the Korean nuclear crisis beyond the scope of this initial agreement.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), an international treaty established in 1968, constitutes a fundamental framework for efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and promote disarmament. The NPT aims to achieve these goals by fostering cooperation among its signatory states and non-signatory nuclear-armed states, emphasizing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and preventing the further vertical proliferation of nuclear arsenals. The treaty has three main pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Non-proliferation obligates non-nuclear-armed states not to acquire nuclear weapons, while nuclear-armed states commit to pursuing disarmament measures. Moreover, the NPT promotes the international exchange of nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes while ensuring that such technologies are not diverted for military use.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), also known as North Korea, became a signatory to the NPT in 1985, committing to refrain from developing or acquiring nuclear weapons and to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections to verify the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities. However, in a move that raised significant concerns, on January 10, 2003, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT, becoming the first and only state party to take such action to date. This decision signaled that North Korea no longer considered itself bound by the treaty's obligations, raising immediate questions about its status within the NPT and the adequacy of the treaty's provisions for managing such withdrawals. The withdrawal of a state from the NPT not only underscored the immediate challenge of ensuring compliance with non-proliferation commitments but also prompted broader reflections on the capacity of existing international institutions to effectively oversee and enforce obligations related to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.

⁸²<https://media.nti.org/pdfs/6ptalks.pdf>

The DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT highlighted the complexities and vulnerabilities within the international nonproliferation regime. It exposed a gap in the treaty's framework when it comes to managing treaty withdrawals and raised concerns about the efficacy of existing mechanisms for ensuring nuclear restraint. This event also drew attention to the broader challenges facing international institutions tasked with enforcing compliance and maintaining the global security order. The NPT's significance in the context of North Korea's actions emphasized the critical need for diplomacy, robust verification mechanisms, and concerted international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The DPRK's departure from the NPT serves as a stark reminder of the ongoing complexities inherent in the pursuit of global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation objectives.

UNSC Sanctions

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has taken a series of resolutions in response to North Korea's nuclear activities, especially its nuclear tests and missile launches. These resolutions, beginning with Resolution 1718 in 2006 after North Korea's first nuclear test, have aimed to curb the regime's nuclear ambitions by imposing various sanctions and restrictions. Each subsequent resolution intensified these measures in response to North Korea's continued defiance of international calls to halt its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. These sanctions have targeted different sectors, including arms trade, exports of minerals, financial transactions, and labor exports, aiming to isolate North Korea economically and politically and to compel it to comply with its international obligations.

Despite the series of UNSC resolutions and the subsequent sanctions imposed on North Korea, questions arise about the overall effectiveness of these measures. While the sanctions have exerted economic pressure on North Korea and significantly restricted its ability to engage in certain activities, they have not completely deterred the regime from pursuing its nuclear and missile programs. North Korea's ability to continue its nuclear tests and develop advanced missile technology, despite sanctions, raises concerns about the sanctions' ability to achieve their intended goals. Additionally, there have been reports of sanctions evasion through illicit networks and the engagement of foreign entities, suggesting that the sanctions' enforcement has not been foolproof.

Furthermore, the humanitarian implications of these sanctions warrant consideration. As these resolutions and sanctions increasingly isolate North Korea, they indirectly impact its citizens, particularly in terms of access to essential goods and services. While the resolutions attempt to mitigate the humanitarian fallout, such as through allowing UN agencies to provide nutrition, health, water, and sanitation assistance, there are concerns that the sanctions could exacerbate the suffering of the North Korean population. Balancing the imperative to address the regime's nuclear threats with the responsibility to prevent undue harm to civilians is a complex challenge that the international community grapples with as it navigates the sanctions regime.

In evaluating the efficiency of the UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea, it's clear that while they have imposed significant economic pressure on the regime and imposed constraints on its activities, they have not been a definitive solution to curbing North Korea's nuclear pursuits. The fact that North Korea has continued its nuclear and missile development even under sanctions underscores the limitations of sanctions as a sole tool to change the regime's behavior. The broader geopolitical context, the regime's resilience, and its willingness to tolerate economic hardship in pursuit of strategic objectives

complicate the overall effectiveness of these sanctions. Addressing the North Korean issue necessitates a multifaceted approach that includes diplomacy, dialogue, and the careful consideration of humanitarian consequences to achieve a comprehensive resolution.

Panmunjom Declaration

The Panmunjom Declaration, an important and historic agreement ratified on April 27, 2018, represents a significant milestone that emerged from the collaborative efforts of North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-un, and South Korea's President, Moon Jae-in. This landmark accord was born during the 2018 inter-Korean Summit, a momentous event that unfolded within the confines of the Peace House, located in the Joint Security Area on the southern side of the Korean border.

At its very core, the Panmunjom Declaration embodies a mutual commitment shared between North and South Korea, one that seeks to achieve multifaceted goals. Foremost among these objectives is the pursuit of enduring peace, a goal that holds paramount importance given the tumultuous history between the two nations. Additionally, the declaration underscores the aspiration for fostering deep-rooted cooperation and, most notably, the ambitious endeavor to unite a region that has remained starkly divided for a considerable span of time. This historic agreement's central focus lies in its intent to formally conclude the Korean War, which has endured for decades, and to comprehensively address the longstanding and complex conflict that has marred relations between North and South Korea. This monumental accord signifies a marked departure from an era of hostility and division, ushering in a new epoch characterized by collaborative harmony and the collective pursuit of prosperity. Central to the Panmunjom Declaration's vision is a meticulous blueprint for enhancing communication and forging stronger connections between the two Koreas. This blueprint emphasizes the dismantling of barriers that have kept the nations apart and the avoidance of confrontations that have historically fueled tensions. This transformative approach seeks to create an environment where dialogue can flourish, facilitating productive engagement and conflict resolution. Moreover, the declaration's significance extends to the international arena. It calls for active efforts to garner international support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, underlining a shared commitment to regional stability and global security. By placing this issue on the global stage, the declaration reinforces the idea that the challenges and responsibilities associated with regional stability are shared by the international community.

The Panmunjom Declaration is undeniably rich in diplomatic significance. It encapsulates the united vision of North Korea and South Korean leaders for a future defined by unity and progress. By presenting the declaration to the United Nations General Assembly, its impact expanded beyond the confines of the peninsula, resonating with audiences worldwide. However, the declaration also acknowledges the inherent complexities of its implementation. It recognizes that achieving lasting change in a region marked by deep-seated conflicts necessitates sustained and multifaceted efforts. It's a commitment to not only reconciliation and peace but also a realistic acknowledgment of the intricate challenges that arise from a history of division. The declaration stands as a testament to the power of diplomacy, cooperation, and a shared determination to forge a new and more harmonious path forward.

Case Study - The Pueblo Incident

The Pueblo Incident took place during the height of the Cold War, a period of intense ideological and geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. The two superpowers and their

respective allies were engaged in a global struggle for influence, with tensions often leading to confrontations and proxy conflicts. The Korean Peninsula was one of the focal points of this Cold War rivalry, as it had been divided into North Korea (supported by the Soviet Union and China) and South Korea (backed by the United States and its Western allies) following World War II.

The USS Pueblo (AGER-2) was part of the U.S. Navy's effort to gather intelligence on the activities of its adversaries during the Cold War. Equipped with advanced surveillance equipment, the ship's primary mission was signals intelligence (SIGINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) gathering. It sailed off the coast of North Korea, a nation seen as a significant Cold War adversary, to intercept and decode North Korean naval and radio signals. These efforts aimed to provide valuable insights into North Korean military activities, which were of great concern to the United States and its allies.

The incident unfolded on January 23, 1968, when the USS Pueblo found itself under attack by North Korean naval vessels and aircraft. The North Koreans claimed that the ship had entered their territorial waters, which the U.S. disputed, maintaining that it had been in international waters. The intense attack led to the capture of the vessel and its crew. Captain Lloyd M. Bucher and the 82 crew members were taken prisoner and subjected to harsh conditions in North Korea.

North Korea quickly seized the opportunity to use the Pueblo Incident as a propaganda tool. The crew was subjected to coercion and forced to make false confessions of espionage activities. This propaganda campaign aimed to not only tarnish the reputation of the United States but also to bolster North Korea's image as a resolute defender of its sovereignty against foreign aggression. Behind the scenes, diplomatic negotiations took place between the United States and North Korea to secure the release of the crew. After nearly 11 months of captivity, an agreement was reached, which included a formal apology from the U.S. government for any perceived intrusion into North Korean waters. On December 23, 1968, the crew of the USS Pueblo was finally released and allowed to return to the United States.

The Pueblo Incident had several lasting impacts. It strained U.S.-North Korean relations for years to come, further deepening the mistrust between the two nations. Additionally, it raised questions about the readiness of U.S. military vessels operating in hostile territories and prompted a review of intelligence-gathering operations during the Cold War. The USS Pueblo remains in North Korean custody, serving as a historical artifact and a reminder of this tense chapter in Cold War history.

Case Study - 2017–2018 North Korea crisis

The 2017-2018 North Korea crisis was a pivotal period characterized by the intensification of tensions and a flurry of diplomatic activity centered on North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. This crisis stemmed from long standing international apprehensions about North Korea's nuclear ambitions, but it reached a critical juncture during 2017 and early 2018, prompting global attention and concern.

Central to the crisis were North Korea's series of nuclear tests, with a particularly noteworthy one conducted in September 2017. This test marked the sixth nuclear detonation by North Korea and was

notably more powerful than previous tests, demonstrating significant progress in the country's nuclear capabilities. Concurrently, North Korea conducted numerous ballistic missile launches throughout 2017, including tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of potentially striking the continental United States. These tests heightened alarm worldwide about North Korea's capacity to deliver nuclear warheads over long distances.

Compounding the situation were the inflammatory exchanges of rhetoric and threats between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump. President Trump's provocative language, such as referring to Kim as "Rocket Man" and issuing threats of "fire and fury," heightened the perception of the crisis and raised tensions to a level not seen in years. In response to North Korea's provocative actions, the United Nations imposed a series of sanctions designed to restrict North Korea's access to financial resources and advanced technologies that could support its weapons programs. These sanctions garnered broad international support, including from traditional allies of North Korea like China and Russia.

However, amid the escalating tensions and mutual provocations, there were also diplomatic initiatives aimed at diffusing the crisis. South Korea played a pivotal role in these diplomatic efforts, engaging in dialogue with North Korea and facilitating summits and inter-Korean talks. These diplomatic endeavors led to a historic meeting between Kim Jong-un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in in April 2018. The most pivotal diplomatic event during this period was the summit between Kim Jong-un and President Donald Trump in Singapore in June 2018. This summit represented the first-ever meeting between sitting leaders of North Korea and the United States. While it produced a joint statement committing to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, progress toward this goal has been characterized by fits and starts, with disagreements and setbacks slowing down the process.

Despite the diplomatic efforts and symbolic gestures, the underlying issues surrounding North Korea's nuclear program remain unresolved. Ongoing tensions on the Korean Peninsula persist, and negotiations between North Korea and the United States have encountered obstacles and breakdowns. North Korea continues to develop its missile capabilities, underscoring the persistent security concerns in the region and the broader global stage. As a result, the 2017-2018 North Korea crisis serves as a stark reminder of the complex and volatile nature of this ongoing geopolitical challenge.

Potential Solutions

Encouraging Denuclearisation Negotiations

Diplomatic negotiations for denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, both during crises and beyond, have been characterized by their complexity and challenges. The pursuit of a peaceful resolution has necessitated addressing the concerns and interests of multiple parties, including North Korea, the United States, South Korea, China, and Russia. The United States has been a central player in these diplomatic efforts dating back to the early 1990s. The primary focus of these endeavors has been mitigating the threats posed by North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, especially concerning the security of the U.S. homeland and its East Asian allies, notably South Korea and Japan. Simultaneously, the United States has sought broader objectives, such as normalizing relations with North Korea. Beyond

the United States, other countries have also engaged in diplomacy with North Korea. South Korea, for instance, has taken active steps to foster dialogue and cooperation with its Northern neighbor. China and Russia, as North Korea's neighbors and historical allies, have played roles in mediating negotiations and exerting influence on the regime. Japan, another key regional player, has participated in diplomatic efforts to address the North Korean crisis. European countries have also been involved in various diplomatic initiatives, showcasing the global concern over North Korea's nuclear activities. However, achieving progress through sustained diplomacy with North Korea has encountered significant challenges. These hurdles include the existence of incompatible stances on engagement prerequisites, differing expectations regarding the outcomes of negotiations, and the North Korean regime's tendency to leverage its nuclear capabilities as a bargaining chip. Moreover, policy shifts within North Korea and among the international actors involved have further complicated the diplomatic landscape, making the quest for denuclearization an ongoing and intricate process.

Additional Sanctions

The international community has indeed imposed various sanctions on North Korea in response to its nuclear and missile programs and related issues. These sanctions have been enacted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and individual countries and regional organizations. The UNSC has passed several resolutions imposing sanctions on North Korea since its first nuclear test in 2006. These sanctions have included trade bans on weapons-related materials and goods, restrictions on financial assets, banking transactions, travel, and trade, as well as bans on luxury goods. Additionally, individual countries and regional bodies like the United States, the European Union, South Korea, Japan, and Australia have implemented their own sanctions targeting North Korea.

However, it's crucial to acknowledge that some argue these sanctions have not been entirely effective in achieving their intended goals. To state the obvious, North Korea is still pursuing its nuclear ambitions. Another critical concern revolves around the humanitarian consequences of sanctions. While exemptions for humanitarian aid exist, sanctions can restrict the flow of goods and resources into North Korea, impacting access to essential supplies like food and medicine. This raises ethical concerns about the suffering of ordinary North Korean citizens and the unintended humanitarian consequences of sanctions.

As delegates of DISEC, you must note that DISEC does NOT have the power to sanction any state or entity; only the UNSC has the power to do that. However, as DISEC, you can encourage the UNSC to pursue such action.

Encouraging a Nuclear-Free Zone in Korea

Pushing for the establishment of a Nuclear-Free Zone in the Korean Peninsula is a potential solution that has been discussed for years to address the nuclear issues and military tensions between North Korea and South Korea. This proposal involves creating a legally binding agreement among countries in the region to prohibit the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This zone would encompass both North and South Korea and would require monitoring by an international organization.

The establishment of a Nuclear-Free Zone in the Korean Peninsula could offer several advantages. It has the potential to reduce tensions between North and South Korea and enhance regional security by minimizing the risk of nuclear conflict. Additionally, it could serve as a model for disarmament and non-proliferation efforts in other regions, demonstrating the commitment of countries to nuclear peace and security. However, there are significant challenges associated with this proposal. Both North and South Korea perceive each other as threats, and achieving their mutual agreement to disarmament would require complex and delicate negotiations. Verification of compliance with the agreement and ensuring effective enforcement would also be crucial and potentially challenging tasks.

Despite these challenges, many view the establishment of a Nuclear-Free Zone in the Korean Peninsula as a feasible solution that, if successfully implemented, could significantly contribute to reducing tensions, enhancing regional stability, and advancing global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. It remains an important diplomatic option to explore in the pursuit of a peaceful resolution to the nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula.

Discussion Questions

1. What is your nation's stance on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and how does it align with other global powers' perspectives?
2. How does your nation view the most effective approach to engage diplomatically with North Korea? Is there a preference for direct negotiations, multilateral talks, or a combination of both?
3. How does the situation in the Korean Peninsula impact your nation's regional stability and security concerns? What measures are being taken to address these concerns?
4. Has your nation used sanctions as a tool to influence North Korea's behavior, and how effective are these measures?
5. How does your nation perceive its role in military alliances in the context of Korean Peninsula tensions, and how does it contribute to regional security?

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